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Progress in medical diagnosis and therapy has raised new problems with far-reaching ethical
implications. Medicine must remain a profession and not become a business. Textbooks must
address ethical problems in the context of health care decisions and not restrict themselves to
pathophysiology and practical therapeutics alone. The relative roles of the principles of
autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice must be balanced and appropriately
applied to individual situations in biomedical ethics.
When therapybecomes futile and the suffering ofthe patient does notjustify any anticipated
benefit, the patient (and/or patient surrogate) may request withholding or even withdrawing
life-prolonging interventions. In the persistent vegetative state, even nutritional support by an
unnatural (tube) route may ethically be denied at the patient's (or surrogate's) informed
decision.
New areas of ethical evaluation have been raised by the desire of some individuals to
prolongation oftheir lives at high expense to the society such that other individuals are denied
services because oflimitation ofavailable resources. There hasbeen a long-standing conflict of
interest between the acceptance by physicians and/or medical institutions of money or gifts
from pharmaceutical companies whose drugs they prescribe, stock, or sell. This practice
increases the cost ofthe drugs and is, in effect, a "sick tax," which is morallywrong.
We are living in the midst of a great technological and biological revolution. It is
almost impossible to keep up with the new knowledge, even in the narrowest of
specialties. Yet in our litigious American society, we are in great legal peril ifwe do
not fulfill the concept of the complete compassionate physician, who keeps all his
patients alive indefinitely in perfect health. However difficult somatic medical
decisions maybe, moral choices are often moreworrisome.
In this context, I was not surprised (although I was dismayed) to hear a colleague
comment, "Don't bother me with what's ethical; I just want to know what's legal.
Medicine is a business. Running a hospital is abusiness. We need attorneys to tell us
what is legal, not 'starry-eyed' ethicists trying to tell uswhat ismoral."
It seems that my colleague is drowning in an ocean of new facts and new devices
and has lost his moral compass. He hasforgottenwhymost ofusbecame doctors-to
make sick people well and to relieve pain and suffering. We entered medicine as a
profession to help others. It is not a business, never was a business, and will be
destroyed ifitbecomes abusiness. Ethics isrightbehaviorandis central to howwego
about our task as health care professionals [1].
Ifwejudge by attendance at meetings and symposia on ethics orbypublications in
105
Abbreviations: AMA: American Medical Association APACHE: acute physiology assessment and
chronic health evaluation CPR: cardiopulmonary resuscitation DNR: do-not-resuscitate (order)
FDA: Food and DrugAdministration ICU: intensive care unit NCI: National Cancer Institute PVS:
persistentvegetative state
Addressreprint requests to: David S. Fischer, M.D., 60Temple Street, Suite 8C, NewHaven, CT06510
Copyright © 1992 by The Yale Journal ofBiology and Medicine, Inc.
All rights ofreproduction in any form reserved.DAVID S. FISCHER
professional journals [2,3], nurses seem much more interested in discussing ethics
than most physicians. In multidisciplinary team conferences, physicians seem to
fixate on details of diagnosis, pathophysiology, and therapeutics, while nurses seem
more concerned about the moral issues. Perhaps they have not forgotten the sage
advice of Dr. Francis Weld Peabody [4]: "The secret of the care of the patient is in
caring for the patient."
ETHICS DISCUSSIONS IN MEDICAL ONCOLOGY TEXTBOOKS
The flood of new knowledge in medical oncology in the past 20 years resulted in
the development ofthis area as a medical subspecialty under the American Board of
Internal Medicine and the publication of many textbooks in the field. In October
1985, Weiss and Vanderpool [5] contributed a "Point ofView" article to theJoumal
of Clinical Oncology, entitled "Ethics in Oncology Textbooks." They reviewed 16
textbooks in the field ofoncology, published since 1979, and found that theonlybook
with a chapter that included "ethics" in its title was Cancer Therapy by Fischer and
Marsh [6]. Some of the others did mention aspects of ethical questions in the text
that were referenced in the indices, but only one other textbook even listed a
subheading of"ethics" in its table ofcontents.
Possibly as a consequence of the Weiss-Vanderpool critique, there is now a
chapter on ethics in the revised editions of three cancer textbooks that did not
include such a chapter in earlier editions, namely the second edition ofSkeel [7], the
third edition of Fischer and Knobf [8], and the second edition of Calabresi and
Schein [9].
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
Although our western concepts of biomedical ethics derive from the Hebrew
Bible, the New Testament, and from the Greek philosophers like Aristotle [10] and
the Greek physicians like Hippocrates [11,12], modern medical ethics probably
begins with the English physician, Percival [13]. The field has been extensively
commented onbytheologians and secularreligiouswritersofmanydenominations-
Catholic [14-17], Protestant [18-20], Jewish [21-24]-and by ethicists [25-31],
economists [32-35], and attorneys [36,37].
A general consensus has evolved that there are some fundamental principles,
perhaps three or four, that should help in making ethical decisions [30] in medicine.
1. Beneficence means that one ought to prevent and remove harm and evil and
promote good; i.e., preserve life, relieve pain, restore health, and relieve suffering.
2. Non-maleficence isbestcharacterized bythe traditional injunction to "first do
no harm." This principle is not absolute, as we may harm a patient by amputating a
leg to save a life and thereby avoid a greater harm. On the other hand, if we
resuscitate a comatose patient in pain with a terminal illness for which there is no
therapy and only a poor quality of life, then we may be violating the principle of
non-maleficence. Generally, we do fairlywell adhering to these principles.
3. Justice is the fair allocation ofmedical resources. Some people get more and
some get less, and the problem is how to decide on rationing and the distribution of
services when there is not enough for everyone [29,31-35]. This problem appears
almost daily in the intensive care unit [38-41]. We struggle with guidelines and ad
hoc solutions. As medications and hospitalizations become more expensive, we
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ration by inconvenience to the patient [42], by hassling the physician [43], and by
denying insurance coverage for what should be covered [44].
Clearly, the principle of justice in American health care is observed more in the
breach than in the observance. Those who can afford it, with cash or insurance, can
usually get good care, and the poor and the uninsured often do not [45] (although
some teaching services provide the poor with excellent care). Prenatal care and care
of newborns, the most vulnerable group, and the group in which any expenditure
would yield the highest dividends, is frequently underfunded. Instead, we spend the
bulk of our national health care dollars on people in the last years of their lives and
on expensive technology like transplants [46]: heart transplants, liver transplants,
bone marrow transplants, and the like, many of unproven or very limited value.
While some advocate more spending for better technology in the belief that it will
ultimately be cost-effective and improve the quality of life [47], others advocate the
rationing of medical care [48] so that the limited resources can be distributed more
justly and equitably. The suggestion has been made that we ration medical progress
and the development of new technology [49] or else so much of our gross national
product will be diverted to health care that we will have to reduce our other
expenditures for desirable services such as education, art, and leisure activities, since
in our egalitarian society, we are philosophically committed to making even the most
expensive medications and procedures available to the poorest and least productive
of our citizens [50] or even to non-citizen residents. At present, just the administra-
tive costs of this effort [50] utilize between 20 percent and 26 percent of the total
spending. To an increasing extent, the government is attempting to make the
physician its instrument of rationing [51], whereas traditionally the physician's
master has been the patient. Can the physician ethically serve two masters? Probably
not, but the reality is that we are being forced to try.
4. Autonomy may be defined as respect for the individuality and "personhood"
ofthe patient [52]. The physician must collaborate with the patient on all substantive
decisions and, in case of a disagreement, the patient is the final authority, or, if
incompetent, a properly chosen surrogate or family member serves to make the
patient's decision, based upon the informed choices provided by the medical team. It
sounds simple in theory but has been complex in its application and has resulted in
much litigation, sometimes at the beginning of life [53] but more frequently at life's
termination.
END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS
In chapter 3 of the biblical book of Ecclesiastes, we are told, "To everything there
is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven; A time to be born, and a
time to die." We all know that animals and people do not live forever, and that,
sooner or later, all must die. What troubles most people is the personal experience of
the death of a significant person in our lives, a family member, a friend, or a patient.
Physicians were so reluctant to tell patients that they had cancer (and hence might
die), that in the fifties [54] and sixties [55], they frequently, if not usually, lied to
them. By the late seventies [56], that attitude had reversed itself, and most physicians
told patients the awful truth, either because they thought it was the ethical thing to
do or to protect themselves from malpractice litigation for "failure to inform."
In 1976, the Massachusetts General Hospital published its house recommenda-
tions for the care of the terminally ill [57] and, in the same issue of the New England
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Journal of Medicine, the Beth Israel Hospital of Boston revealed its policy on
do-not-resuscitate orders [58]. These were attempts to codify and legitimate prac-
tices that were becoming increasingly common. There has been some discussion of
how much ofthe impetus for this was based on compassion forpatients and families
who might suffer unnecessarily from prolonging the act ofdying, and how much ofit
was prompted by the hospitals' legal staffs to protect against litigation. Indeed, the
editorial accompanying those two landmark articles was written by a professor (an
attorney) at the Harvard Law School. He comments [59]:
The hospitals are coming out of the closet! It is an event of the first
importance that responsible administrators at two great hospitals-indepen-
dently, I believe-should promulgate and discuss publicly explicit policies
about the deliberate withdrawal or non-application of life-prolonging mea-
sures. That such measures are in fact regularly withheld or withdrawn is an
open secret, but the course ofdecision and the testimony in the Quinlan case
show how wary the medical profession can be when the spotlight ofpublicity
illuminates itspractices.
To safeguard the patient's autonomy and to remove any ambiguity in the operation
of the guidelines, a third article [60] in the same issue urges patients to prepare a
living will so that their wishes will be known and executed. The purpose of the
policies is to ensure that physicians do not keep terminally ill patients alive against
theirwill. The decisions shouldbemadebythephysician andthe patient together. In
the editorial, a prescient comment has proven tobe all too true [59]:
The last word, I fear, maybe with the lawyers for the meaning andvalidity of
these new departures are very likely to be tested in court. The fact of the
matter is that lawyers have not been a constructive force in the shaping ofthe
relation of the public to the health professions. We lawyers have supposedly
been assiduous only to obtain redress for the negligence of an overbearing
and excessively self-protective profession, but the result of this ferocious
assiduity has been an atmosphere of distrust and excessive caution, which
surelyprejudicesthepublic, andwhichthepatient cannot evencontract outof
with any assurance. I suspect that the only people who have really done well
out ofthe malpractice imbroglio have been lawyers.
As physicians and the public became more comfortable with open discussion of
death and dying and end-of-life decisions [61], formal policies evolved and were
published for do-not-resuscitate decisions. One ofthe earliest was that ofYale-New
Haven Hospital, which was developed under the chairmanship of R.J. Levine and
was reprinted in the Wong and Swazey symposium report [62] and also in Fischer
and Marsh [6]. It delineated the identification of the responsible physician and the
necessity of communications among health care professionals. It classified the
approaches to management of the terminally ill, emphasized communication with
the patient and family, and outlined the mechanics of writing do-not-resuscitate
(DNR) orders. With time, many articles have examined the results ofcardiopulmo-
naryresuscitation (CPR) [63-66] and noted its low incidence ofsuccess. Others have
questioned its routine use [67-70] and deplored its excessive employment. The
evolving court cases and reports of clinical experience have refined the indications
108OBSERVATIONS ON ETHICAL PROBLEMS AND TERMINAL CARE
and procedures [71-77]. The Yale-New Haven Hospital guidelines were revised in
1991 [78] to accommodate to the changingconsensus.
In 1988, New York State passed a law [79] requiring physicians in hospitals or
extended care facilities to discuss in advance with patients and/or their surrogates
the patient's wishes in regard to CPR and DNR orders. In the absence of a written
DNRorder,whichmustbe rewritten everythree days, thelawrequiredresuscitation,
even in the terminally ill metastatic cancerpatient whose physiciansviewthe CPR as
futile at least, and possibly cruel [80,81]. The law also required all home-bound
patients to be resuscitated regardless of their wishes by emergency paramedical
teams. That aspect ofthe lawwasrecently amended toallowhome-bound patients to
consent to a DNR order by filling out a standard form and wearing a special DNR
identification bracelet [82].
WITHHOLDING AND WITHDRAWING LIFE SUPPORT
The principles of biomedical ethics have been applied to try to justify medical
interventions or thewithholding orcessation ofsupportwith the expectationthat the
patient will die as a result [83]. The problem arises in the chronically critically ill
patient in an intensive care unit (ICU) forweeks ormonths, with no chance toregain
a tolerable quality of life. The APACHE (acute physiology assessment and chronic
health evaluation) II classification system for acutely ill patients [84] showed that
patients inthe ICUwith asingleorganfailureforone to sevendayshad amortalityof
20 percent to 40 percent; for two organ system failures, it was 50 percent to 70
percent, and for three or more organ system failures, mortality rose to 80 percent to
100 percent. Advanced age increased the likelihood of an organ system failure and
death. The association of respiratory failure with sepsis, renal failure, liver failure,
severebums, oradvancedhematologicalmalignancyresulted in amortalityrateof95
percent to 100 percent in the hospital. As hope of recovery fades, it becomes
degrading to the patient to be sustained in a subhuman situation and, at some point,
with the consent ofthe patient (orsurrogate, ifthe patient is incompetent), itmaybe
theobligation ofthe physician to help the patient passively to achieve a peaceful and
dignified death.
To safeguard the patient's autonomy, guidelines have been established for the
decision-making process. In its most recent update in 1991, the Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, ofthe American Medical Association (AMA) [85], stated:
It is widely acknowledged that patients have the right to refuse medical
treatment, even when such refusal is likely to result in serious injuryor death.
A patient, therefore, may express in advance his or her preference that CPR
be withheld in the event ofcardiac arrest. Such refusal may serve as the basis
for a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order. A decision to withhold CPR from an
incompetent patient can be madeby a surrogate decisionmaker, based on the
previously expressed preferences of the patient or, if such preferences are
unknown, in accordance with the patient'sbest interests.
The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research [76] noted that a "competent and informed
patient or an incompetent patient's surrogate is entitled to decide with the attending
physician that an order against resuscitation should be written in the chart."
Religious leaders in general have agreed. Pope Pius XII [86] stated that the rights
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and duties of the physician are to correlate with those of the patient and that the
rights ofthe family are subordinate to the patient'swishes and desires. Hence, health
care professions were charged to use "ordinary means" oflife support predicated on
the circumstances of person, place, time, and culture in the care of serious illness,
and such efforts were not seen as direct disposal of life and, therefore, not active
euthanasia. A do-not-resuscitate order is an ethical and rational decision when
warranted by the facts [68]. Unfortunately, sometimes it does not fulfill its major
goals [87].
In the guidelines of the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs [85], it is
further stated that:
The second exception to the presumption favoring CPR is applicable to cases
inwhich an attempt to resuscitate the patientwould be futile in thejudgment
of the treating physician. A physician is not ethically obligated to make a
specific diagnostic or therapeutic procedure available to a patient, even on
specific request, if the use of such a procedure would be futile [67,88,89].
However,judgments offutility are subject to awidevariety ofinterpretations.
The potential impact ofthisvariability is profound, given recent evidence that
perhaps, as many as 88 percent of all DNR orders are based in part on the
physician'sjudgment thatresuscitation ofthepatientwouldbefutile [90,91,92].
Despite relatively similar prognosis, patients with AIDS or lung cancer are much
more likely to receive DNR orders than patients with cirrhosis or severe congestive
heart failure [93], presumably because physicians regard AIDS and lung cancer as
less responsive to therapy than liver disease and CHF.
Frequently, physicians are reluctant to discuss DNR orders with patients [94,95],
although many patients welcome an honest discussion. The new federal Patient
Self-Determination Act (The Act) which took effect December 1, 1991, requires
Medicare/Medicaid-receiving health care providers to inform patients of their
existing rights under state law to refuse treatment and to prepare advance directives
[96]. This legislation simply affirms rights in most (but not all) states already
recognized under the common law, namely the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his or her person and to the doctrine of informed consent
and a privacy right. In the Cruzan case [97], the United States Supreme Court
recognized that "a competent person has a liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause in refusing unwanted medical treatment." Thus, patients in all states now
have the right to refuse unwanted medical therapy. The full implications ofThe Act
are not yet clear, but an evolving literature is attempting to evaluate it [98,99,100].
Patients are stillwell advised to have a livingwill or a health care proxy orboth [101].
Ofcourse, the patient's physicians must be informed ofthe livingwill and the health
care proxy. The stringency of the policies in some hospitals require physicians to
perform procedures that are useless or that add to the patient's suffering without
corresponding benefit because a do-not-resuscitate orderhas notbeen approved by a
family or surrogate. It has been suggested [102] that physicians should be allowed to
write a do-not-resuscitate order over familyobjectionswhen all four ofthe following
conditions prevail: (1) the patient lacks decision-making capability; (2) the burdens
of treatment clearly outweigh the benefits; (3) the surrogate does not give an
appropriate reason in terms ofpatient values, preferences, or best interests; and (4)
the physician has made serious efforts to communicate with the family and to
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mediate the disagreement. Actually, a strong case had previously been made that a
physician should not even offer resuscitation when the medical judgment is that
resuscitation will be ineffective, further therapy is futile, successful resuscitation
would offer no medical benefit, or deterioration is so far gone that resuscitation
would only briefly postpone the act of dying and thus prolong the patient's final
agony [67,68]. It has been suggested that too often physicians shirk their responsibil-
ity to make this decision because of a fear of liability in our litigation-conscious
society and pass the decision on to the courts, at great economic cost to society and
prolongation of patient suffering [103]. Nowhere is this problem seen more fre-
quently than in the patient in a persistent vegetative state.
THE PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE
The term "persistent vegetative state" (PVS) is used to designate permanently
unconscious patients who manifest irregular episodes of wakefulness and sleep with
responses to verbal stimuli and light in a meaningless fashion. They often have facial
signs of interest with suggestions of smiling or sucking or tearing of the eyes and
groping of the hands. Ifgiven nutrition and other support functions, they can live for
months, years, or decades [104]. Since heartbeat and respiration are spontaneous,
they do not meet classical criteria of death; since they do not have flat brain waves,
they do not meet the Harvard criteria of brain death [105]. These patients were
therefore kept alive by extensive support systems for long periods.
The attempt of compassionate families to withdraw useless therapy generally met
with little success until the public reaction to the case ofKaren Ann Quinlan [106]. In
this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled, on the basis of a constitutional right
of privacy, that a "substituted judgment" may be used to remove a patient in a
persistentvegetative state from advanced life support. In this instance, the respirator
was removed, but the patient continued to breathe on her own and lived a few years
longer.
The principle of "substituted judgment" was extended in the Barber case [107].
The 55-year-old patient, Clarence Herbert, had severe brain damage after a post-
operative myocardial infarction. His family and physicians agreed that he did not
wish to be kept alive in this condition, based on his earlier comments, and they
agreed to remove his respirator. He did not die then. Hence, in conformitywith their
understanding of his wishes, all life support was withdrawn, and he died. The Los
Angeles district attorney charged the two attending physicians with murder. The
California Court of Appeals ruled that further life support would have been
medically futile and that the physicians had acted properly, with the consent of the
family, and did not require prior judicial approval. The court did not distinguish
between basic and advanced life support and chose to view the former as "more
similar to other medical procedures than to typical human ways of providing
nutrition and hydration" and recommended the "benefits and burdens" of basic life
support "be evaluated in the same manner as any other medical procedure."
In a Connecticut case [108], the removal of a nasogastric tube was the crux of the
litigation. Carol McConnell was an emergency room nurse who suffered traumatic
brain injuries in an automobile accident and was being kept alive in PVS by a feeding
gastrostomy tube which her family eventually sued to have removed. The State
contended that every patient was entitled to food and fluids and that the State's
interest in preserving the "life" of the patient took precedence over the family's
illlDAVID S. FISCHER
request towithdraw support, even though the patient had expressed awish not to be
sustained in a comatose state.
The court held that the family was the appropriate surrogate to act for a patient
who was not competent and had not executed a living will or established a durable
power ofattorneybut had expressed apreference ofcare. It furtherobserved, "there
is no legal, ethical, or moral distinction between a respirator and a gastrostomy tube
which this court can attach to the facts in this case." Thejudgment was affirmed on
appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court. In an address commenting on the case
subsequently, the ChiefJustice ofthe Connecticut Supreme Court [109] said:
I thinkitisunlikelythatwewillquicklyresolve themyriadofconcerns that are
raised by the conflictingviews about the use and abuse ofmedical technology
topreserve the life ofthosewho, although notbraindead, are terminallyill. A
just and caringsociety cannot helpbutbe tornbetween its desire to honor the
privacyofthosewhohavebeensorelyafflicted, and itsfearsthat thevictimsof
accidents and disease may be further abused by the self-seeking caretakers.
The obvious fact that there are no easy answers is why this conference is so
important.
In closing, let me repeat what I have said on another occasion about the
roleofcourtsincases like this. Courts are not eagertoresolve newagendason
the forefront ofthe complex interrelation between medicine and the law. We
decide the cases because they are here and won't go away, but we are keenly
aware that we lack any special expertise in finding tolerable accommodations
for these perplexing issues. It is our fervent hope that, working together, we
can devise principles and protocols that will, whenever possible, provide
guidance for private rather than public resolution of the questions of the
appropriate levelofhealth care towhich we are all entitled.
In an attempt to clarify the issue for physicians, the AMA Councils on Scientific
Affairs and on Ethical and Judicial Affairs issued a joint statement. They [110]
reviewed the criteria for the diagnosis of permanent unconsciousness and PVS and
thesignificantlegaldecisions inthisarea.Theyindicated thatstateshavenotenacted
uniform laws nor have courts rendered uniformjudgments, but "the record to date
indicatesthatwhenphysicians and families agree on aparticularcourse, theprospect
ofadverse legal consequences is greatly diminished."
Not all physicians and ethicists agree that fluid and nutritional support should be
withdrawn from PVS patients unless there is clear evidence that the patient
indicated such a course [111]. This point was the central issue in the Cruzan case
[97]. The State of Missouri asserted its right to continue to feed Nancy Cruzan in a
PVS against the wishes of her family. The United States Supreme Court recognized
that many states base the right to refuse treatment on the common-law right to
informed consent and other states on the constitutional right to privacy, and some
states invoke both. The court also recognized a federal libertyinterest underthe due
process clause. It affirmed, however, the right of the State of Missouri to demand
"clear and convincing proof of Cruzan's desire to have hydration and nutrition
withdrawn," and denied the request of her family to remove the gastrostomy. Later,
the Cruzan family returned to the state court with additional witnesses, who
provided the necessary evidence, and the tube was removed. Twelve days later, on
December 26, 1990, Nancy Cruzan died at age 33.
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The case spurred several states to establish or update "health care proxy"
legislation and stirred support forthe Patient Self-Determination Actof1990 [98,99]
that requires (effective December 1, 1991) hospitals and nursing homes that receive
Medicare and/or Medicaid funds to inform patients oftheir rights under state laws
to make living wills or other advance directives. There has also been a flurry of
articles suggesting guidelines [85,112,113] and discussions in lay publications [114].
The question of withdrawing intravenous fluids has also been raised, with the
implication that it is moral in the near terminally ill [115]. There is, however, still no
general consensus, and there are questions about how accurate proxy predictions
may be [116] and how accurate the determination of terminal illness or moribund
condition may be [117]. The feeling that many questions remain unanswered after
the Cruzan decisionispervasive, and some [118] feel that the decision haspotentially
harmful effects in that itmay undermine familydecisionmaking, encourage cynicism
and disregard forthe law, and promote defensive medicine. It alsoprovides thebasis
for more litigation to define "clear and convincing," which manyfeel is neither clear
nor convincing in the 5-4 decision, with two separate dissenting opinions, and two
separate concurring opinions, a total offive opinions [119].
RIGHT TO LIVE LONGER
As the principle of patient autonomy begins to take on an aura of "divine law,"
physicians are increasingly finding some patients and families making demands that
seem medically unreasonable [120], and there need to be limits to the physician's
obligation orelse medical ethics may erode traditional medicalvalues [121].
Recently, inMinneapolis, Minnesota, acasewentthrough thecourt thatmaybeof
this ilk. Hennepin County Medical Center went to court to get permission to
discontinue a respirator on Helge Wangle, an 87-year-old comatose woman in PVS
secondary to acardiac arrest and severe anoxicencephalopathyformore than ayear.
All of her physicians felt that use of a respirator was medically inappropriate
[122,123] and "non-beneficial." Nonetheless, her husband and children demanded
that the respirator be continued because they believed in miracles and hoped that a
miracle would occur on Mrs. Wangle's behalf. This hope had cost the taxpayers and
society more than $700,000 by the time the hospital filed court papers. The court
awarded custody ofthe patient's health care to her husband, who was committed to
continuingtherespirator andsupportive care indefinitely. Mercifully, forthepatient,
the taxpayers, the doctors and nurses of Hennepin County Medical Center, and
society ingeneral, the patient died three days after the court decision.
Tomysurprise, the editorial intheNewEnglandJoumalofMedicine applauded the
decision as avindication oftheprinciple ofautonomy [124]. Presumablygoodclinical
judgment, considerations ofbeneficence, justice, and personal medical moral values
must all be sacrificed to the almighty autonomy principle [121]. Money in large
amounts must be spent to keep alive indefinitely an 87-year-old in coma, with no
brain function. Might those resources be better spent on care ofindigent newborns,
on prenatal care, on food for the hungry, and shelter for the homeless? Will
technology become our master? Just because something can be done does not mean
that it should be done. Medical decisions should not be the province of the courts.
They should be the job of the clinic and the medical care team, augmented, if
necessary, by anethicist or an ethics consultation team [125-128], although there are
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some who question their value with the catchy title, "Godsend or 'God Squad'?"
[129].
Perhaps every hospital needs its own code of ethics [130,131] in addition to the
AMAcode ofmedical ethics and the opinions ofthe Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs [132,133].
As technology progresses, the ethical problems will increase and require more
thought and effort to decide who lives and who dies and to keep medicine a moral
profession, instead ofallowingit to becomejust another amoral business.
SOME POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
There are many ethical dilemmas that confront physicians treating cancer pa-
tients. For many cancers, the results of treatment are so poor that there is no
standard therapy. Any therapy selected is then, to a greater or lesser extent, an
experiment. Some ofthese experiments are done on an investigational protocol of a
cooperative group under the supervision of the National Cancer Institute (NCI) or
by a university cancer clinic with NCI approval, or the clinician may treat off
protocol. In any case, there may be pressure by a pharmaceutical company to use its
drug in preference to others. When that decision isbased on an honest review ofthe
available literature, the patient's best interests are served. When the decision is
influenced by gifts or money to the physician, then one must question the ethical
basis forthe decision.
Recently, it has come to public attention that pharmaceutical companies have
been giving substantial gifts to physicians [134], so-called "payola" to influence their
choice of drugs. Medical journals had been pointing out this fact for several years
[135]. Doctors have received gifts ranging from pens and pads to all-expense-paid
trips to vacation resorts, worth up to $5,000, to attend promotional lectures for
pharmaceutical products. Other physicians have received grossly extravagant hono-
rariaforlecturesthatpromote aproprietaryproduct [136]. Thesepractices indirectly
use the patient's moneyto reward and influence thephysician toprescribe drugs that
may or may not be in the patient's best interest.
Most physicians deny that they could be so influenced. Rawlins [137], however,
observed that
few doctors accept that they themselves have been corrupted. Most doctors
believe that they are quite untouched by the seductive ways of the industry's
marketing men; that they are uninfluenced by the promotional propaganda
they receive; that they can enjoy a company's "generosity" in the form ofgifts
and hospitality without prescribing its products. The degree to which the
profession, mainly composed of honourable and decent people, can practice
such self-deceit is quite extraordinary. No drug company gives away its
stockholders' money in an act ofdisinterested generosity.
In addition, it has been noted that cash finders' fees are being paid for research
subjects [138]. This conduct is not far removed from fee-splitting, which organized
medicine rejected as unethical many years ago. On a more subtle level, industry
reimbursement to investigators and research institutes and universities, far in excess
of the costs of the research, raises additional ethical issues [139]. So does the easy
passage from the university to the pharmaceutical company, or the offering of
academic titles andpromotion in theuniversityfor referral ofresearch subjects. This
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aspect is an especially sensitive area because even the National Cancer Institute was
funding some research studiesbased on "bodycounts." When investigators, sections,
and departments in a medical school profit from increased numbers of research
subjects [140], one should not be surprised to see them give a further incentive to
such referrals by a reward in their "coin of the realm," academic titles and
promotions. This behavior is not as blatant as the cash rewards ofindustry, is harder
to track and prove, and can usually be rationalized. With the enormous profits of
pharmaceutical companies comes great economic, political, and educational power.
They can hire or give gifts to professors, deans, congressmen, newspaper andjournal
editors, and reporters.
Tentative answers to some of these problems have come from various representa-
tives of organized medicine. In Britain, the General Medical Council added to its
standards of practice the admonition [141] that acceptance of money or gifts from
firmswhich sell items that doctors mayprescribe should be regarded as improper.
A similar position was taken by the American Surgical Association at its annual
meeting in April 1987. In 1990, the Board of Regents of the American College of
Physicians endorsed and published a position paper by its Ethics Committee, which
was also endorsed by the American Thoracic Society, The American Society of
Hematology, and the American Diabetes Association. It stated, asposition number 1
[142]:
Gifts, hospitality, or subsidies offered to physicians by the pharmaceutical
industry ought not to be accepted if acceptance might influence or appear to
others to influence the objectivity ofclinicaljudgement. A useful criterion in
determiningacceptable activities and relationships is: Wouldyoubewillingto
have these arrangements generally known?
The question of conflicts of interest in medical center/industry research relation-
ships was dealt with in ajoint report by the AMA Council on Scientific Affairs and
the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs in May 1990, which recommended [143]
that there be careful review and specificguidelines for the clinical staffon conflict of
interest, and full disclosures by clinical staff about financial associations with
commercial corporations.
As an aside, one may wonder what are the tax implications for a tax-exempt
institution performing contract work, for a profit, for a commercial enterprise. It
would seem that the local taxpayers carry an extra burden in that instance. Many
institutions accept the money, but very few consider the ethical implications of the
arrangement. The money is too good to pass up. To the best of my knowledge, this
question has not been explored in any depth. In myopinion, it isworthyofhigh-level
study and discussion.
In December 1990, after a year of deliberations, the Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs of the AMA issued its opinion on gifts to physicians [144]. They
suggested that any gifts accepted by physicians should primarily entail a benefit to
patients and be ofeducationalvalue, like textbooks, pens, and notepads. Support for
educational conferences should be given to the conference sponsor possibly to
reduce tuition costs, but no cash or indirect support should be given to physicians
attending the conference to defray travel, lodging, or other personal expenses.
Faculty at meetings may accept reasonable honoraria and reimbursement of ex-
penses. Content of the conference should be determined by the organizers and not
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by the industrial companies contributing to its support. I think the Council missed
the point. All gifts create a reciprocal obligation and hence a conflict of interest.
Furthermore, who elected the drug industry to "tax the sick" to support education?
Legislatures are elected to make those decisions.
The newFood and DrugAdministration (FDA) commissionershared hisconcerns
on this subject in July 1991 in the New England Joumal ofMedicine. He indicated
[145] that "some of these industry-sponsored activities can provide health care
professionals with excellent opportunities for education and scientific exchange.
They can also be used for the illegal promotion of the sponsor's products. It is
important for the FDA and health care professionals tojoinforces in protecting free
scientific exchange from commercial abuses."
It hasbeen estimated thatdrugcompanypromotional spendingtotals$2.5 billion a
year, about $200 million of which goes to continuing medical education [146]. The
pharmaceutical industry, through the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association,
has accepted the guidelines of the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
[147]. Ifthey implement the guidelines, there is apotential forsavingmore than$200
million. With less advertising, they might save $2 billion a year. It will be interesting
to see whether any of this saving will be used to reduce drug costs to patients, or
whether it will be used to enhance already generous salaries to company executives
or to raise dividends to stockholders. This outcomewill be areal test ofcommitment,
generosity, or greed. At present, the pharmaceutical companies are regarded asjust
abusiness like anyother. Theirpowerover life and death for so manypeople should,
however, put them in the category of enterprises (actually monopolies) concerned
with the public interest, like the telephone company, thewatercompany, the electric
company, and otherpublicutilities regulated bypublic service authorities.
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